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THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT APPROVES A 
CONTROVERSIAL POLICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT TACTIC USED 
ON MISSOURI HIGHWAYS CODE NAME: “GOTCHA!” A CASE 
NOTE ON STATE v. MACK 
The scenario is simple.  Any ordinary citizen operating a car could walk, or 
more precisely drive, right into it.  “It” is what courts and police alike have 
termed a “ruse checkpoint.”  Although several states have tweaked the 
checkpoint procedure to fit their state’s individual goals, the basic premise 
remains constant.  The story goes something like this: a motorist sees a sign 
posted on a highway alerting him that there is a narcotics checkpoint at an exit 
farther down the road.  The motorist now has a decision to make.  The driver 
can, for either legitimate or perhaps illegitimate reasons, decide to exit the 
highway and avoid the upcoming checkpoint.  Once the motorist exits the 
highway, however, he is surprised to find that he has driven right into the 
checkpoint he sought to avoid by exiting in the first place.  The motorist has 
just succumbed to the premise behind the program, or put another way, 
“Gotcha!” 
The so-called “ruse checkpoint” described previously is a tactic used by 
police in an effort to assist in America’s War on Drugs.1  Few individuals 
would deny that drug use is both a prevalent and an increasing problem in the 
United States.  Police departments across the country, including those in the 
state of Missouri, hold the belief that this relatively new brand of police tactic 
will significantly disrupt drug flow in the country.  Ideally, although not 
practically, the threat of these checkpoints causes “people carrying narcotics 
[to] become erratic, exit off the interstate, throw the narcotics out . . . cross the 
median and go back in the opposite direction.”2  Once a driver exhibits such 
erratic behavior, the police can pounce.  The problem with such a scenario, 
however, is that few drivers display such obviously suspicious conduct.  Many 
unsuspecting drivers do not realize they are in the trap until they are speaking 
with a police officer.  A further problem with these checkpoints is that police 
are usually working with a preconceived bias that any individual exiting the 
highway is hiding something.  Such a prejudice obliterates an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment protection where seizures are generally unreasonable 
without a requisite amount of individualized suspicion.3  To further muddy the 
 
 1. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 2. United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 355 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 3. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
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waters, police have also used “mixed-motive” checkpoints,4 which may have a 
constitutional purpose, such as a driver’s license stop, but they also have an 
unconstitutional purpose, such as intercepting illegal narcotics.  With police 
enforcement utilizing various types of ruse checkpoints, a motorist is left to 
guess as to the extent of protection he is afforded under the Constitution. 
Although the use of ruse checkpoints is more of a recent phenomenon, 
roadblock jurisprudence has received substantial treatment in American 
courtrooms.  After various decisions, some upholding certain types of 
checkpoints and roadblocks while disapproving of others, the United States 
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the issue in the November 2000 case of 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.5  The Court there held that checkpoints 
designed with the primary purpose of general crime prevention, as is the case 
with most “ruse checkpoints,” are a violation of an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.6 
Although those in the legal community with an interest in roadblock 
jurisprudence hoped Edmond had answered the difficult issues left surrounding 
roadblock cases, the Missouri Supreme Court demonstrated that Edmond left 
some wiggle room when it handed down a 4-3 decision approving 
suspicionless “ruse checkpoints” on Missouri roadways.7  The majority in 
Mack found distinguishing characteristics between the case before it and 
Edmond that justified a contrary ruling.8  This case note intends to take a closer 
look at the rationale driving the decision in Mack and suggests that a blanket 
rule prohibiting all deceptive checkpoints, such as the one in Mack, is the best 
way to halt even further erosion of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights 
when vehicle checkpoints are involved.  This case note will begin by 
examining some basic Fourth Amendment tenets in Part I and then proceed to 
examine some of the principal cases that created the area of law referred to as 
“roadblock jurisprudence” in Part II.  Parts III and IV will conclude with an in-
depth look at Mack and analyze why “ruse checkpoints” should be abolished as 
a form of police tactic altogether. 
 
 4. See Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 5. 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000).  (The checkpoint in Edmond, unlike the one to be discussed in 
Mack, was not a ruse checkpoint.). 
 6. Id. at 41-42.  The Court held the checkpoint program violated the Fourth Amendment 
because the primary purpose of the checkpoint program was ultimately indistinguishable from the 
general interest in crime control.  Id. 
 7. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 710-11.  Justice Limbaugh wrote the majority opinion and Justices 
Benton, Holstein, and Price concurred.  Justice Stith dissented in a separate opinion in which 
Justices White and Wolff joined. 
 8. See id. at 710. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] “GOTCHA!” A CASE NOTE ON STATE v. MACK 671 
I.  BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL TENETS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
One of the wonderful aspects of living in America is that citizens are 
afforded the highest degree of protection of their individual liberties and rights 
of privacy.  The Fourth Amendment was designed to protect such rights.  The 
Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.9 
The various types of checkpoints discussed throughout this note share the 
common bond of having Fourth Amendment implications.  Courts determined 
long ago that roadblocks and checkpoints constituted a “seizure” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.10  The principal Fourth Amendment issue 
most courts are left to face in roadblock and checkpoint cases is whether or not 
the checkpoint system in place is “reasonable” according to the language of the 
Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth Amendment requires all searches and seizures 
to be reasonable.11  This note focuses primarily on roadblocks and vehicle 
checkpoints; the lion’s share of the analysis will examine the reasonableness of 
initial stops or “seizures.” 
Most judicial interpretations have classified searches and seizures as 
reasonable so long as some quantum of individualized suspicion was present.12  
Thus, an officer may constitutionally conduct a brief, investigatory stop when 
he has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.13  
However, because courts began to relax the once-stringent standards of 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause, the checkpoint decisions have 
become harder to decide in a consistent manner.14  Courts have overlooked the 
 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 10. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).  The Brugal court added, 
“[t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only 
for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitute[d] a seizure of a person within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.”  United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 356 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 12. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
 13. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 14. The Court notably carved its exceptions to the probable cause and suspicionless search 
analysis in three similar cases.  See generally Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Camara v. 
Mun. Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 
U.S. 541 (1967).  These three cases discussed the possibility of an “administrative” need to 
enforce government building code regulations that would justify the relaxation of the 
individualized suspicion and warrant standards.  Elaborating further on the “administrative 
exception” were the cases of New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987), which discussed 
administrative inspection of “closely regulated businesses,” and Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 
501 (1978), which discussed the fire department’s warrantless re-entry to investigate the burning 
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absence of warrants and individualized suspicion requirements in various 
settings.  Justice Scalia in California v. Acevedo, commented that the warrant 
requirement had become “so riddled with exceptions that it [is] basically 
unrecognizable.”15  Even though the Court has developed certain exceptions to 
the warrant and individualized suspicion requirements, including “special 
needs” exceptions,16 administrative policy exceptions,17 and certain roadblock 
or checkpoint exceptions for border-patrol18 and sobriety19 enforcement, they 
are still the primary defenses citizens of this country have against invasions 
against their privacy rights, and it is still held in the highest regard.20 
Police ruse checkpoints present an intriguing problem that courts now must 
face.  The ruse checkpoints do attempt to combat a societal ill in much the 
same way as the checkpoints in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte21 and 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz22 did.  The courts have the option 
of creating yet another exception for these drug interdiction ruse checkpoints, 
but this begs the question of how far the courts can go before all Fourth 
Amendment safeguards are gone.  A recent article by Craig Bradley highlights 
the difficulties that courts, especially the United States Supreme Court, have 
had with this topic.23  Bradley identified a theme that developed on the 
Supreme Court after the arrival of Justice Stephen Breyer, where the Court 
“consistently resist[ed] attempts by police to increase their power to interfere 
 
of a furniture store.  Another exception developed subsequent to those decisions, and is now 
known as the “special needs” exception.  The cases of New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) 
and Veronia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), which involved searches in a school 
setting, and Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), which involved 
mandatory urinalyses testing in an employment setting, further chipped away at the 
individualized suspicion rule and the warrant requirement.  For a more in-depth look at both the 
administrative exception and the special needs exception, see Leslie P. Butler, Note, City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond: An Unprecedented Use of “Primary” Purpose Leaves Wide Open the 
Door for “Secondary” Problems, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 175, 178 n. 13-14 (2002); Jennifer Y. 
Buffaloe, “Special Needs” and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the 
Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 536 (1997). 
 15. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991); Charles W. Chotvacs, The Fourth 
Amendment Warrant Requirement: Constitutional Protection or Legal Fiction? Noted Exceptions 
Recognized by the Tenth Circuit, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 331, 331 (September 2001/August 2002). 
 16. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325; Acton, 515 U.S. 646; Skinner, 489 U.S. 602. 
 17. See Frank, 369 U.S. 360; Camara, 387 U.S. 523; See, 387 U.S. 541; Burger, 482 U.S. 
691; Tyler, 436 U.S. 499. 
 18. United States v. Marinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976). 
 19. See generally Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
 20. See Chotvacs, supra note 15, at 331. 
 21. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
 22. 496 US 444 (1990). 
 23. Craig M. Bradley, The Court’s New Approach to the Fourth Amendment, 38 TRIAL 82, 
82 (2002). 
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with (legally) innocent civilians, but it refuse[d] to intervene in how police deal 
with suspects when there is probable cause to arrest or search.”24 
As this note will illustrate, the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in State 
v. Mack does not entirely support Bradley’s proposition.  In an effort to 
produce a more definitive answer to the constitutional validity of the 
checkpoint question, the United States Supreme Court decided Edmond, 
providing courts with a “primary purpose” inquiry25 and the established 
“Brown Balancing Test,”26 both of which will be discussed.  The Missouri 
Supreme Court could have applied these principles to determine the 
reasonableness of the “ruse checkpoint” scheme it reviewed in Mack, but it 
used other means to arrive at its decision.  Therefore, roadblock jurisprudence 
in the state of Missouri is still unsettled in many ways. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF ROADBLOCK AND CHECKPOINT JURISPRUDENCE— THE 
SUPREME COURT RULES CERTAIN CHECKPOINTS CONSTITUTIONAL, OTHERS 
NOT 
A. The Beginning: United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte heard consolidated appeals from both the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit.27  The respondents were 
appealing criminal prosecutions for offenses relating to the transportation of 
illegal Mexican aliens across the border.28  The respondents involved in the 
consolidated appeals from the Ninth Circuit were arrested at a permanent 
checkpoint operated by the Border Patrol near the Mexican border.29  The 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40-41 (2000). 
 26. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). 
 27. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
 28. Id. at 545.  All of the checkpoint programs operated in a similar manner and were in a 
fixed location near the Mexico-United States border.  Id.  Motorists were made aware of the 
checkpoints by large flashing signs hanging over the highways.  Id. at 545-46.  All vehicles were 
forced to stop at these checkpoints.  Id.  If, after the initial brief detention, the Border Patrol 
Agent believed suspicious behavior was afoot, the motorist proceeded to a secondary inspection 
area for further questioning.  Id. at 546.  The whole process generally took only a few minutes.  
Id. at 546-47. 
 29. Id. at 545.  Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte was convicted after a jury trial on two 
counts of illegally transporting aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(2).  Id. at 548.  
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia was also charged with two counts of illegally transporting an 
alien and conspiring to commit that offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; however, unlike 
Martinez-Fuerte, his motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the stop was granted.  Id. at 
548-549.  Respondents Raymond Guillen and Fernando Medrano-Barragan were both charged 
with four counts of illegally transporting aliens, four counts of inducing the illegal entry of aliens 
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(4), and one conspiracy count.  Id. at 549.  Like it did with 
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Ninth Circuit held that without reasonable suspicion, these stops and 
interrogations violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.  It reversed 
respondent Martinez-Fuerte’s conviction and affirmed the decisions in the 
other cases.30  In a similar case involving the transportation of illegal aliens, 
the Fifth Circuit decided differently than the Ninth Circuit and held that the 
permanent checkpoints did not violate the Constitution.31  In an attempt to end 
this circuit split, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine the legality and constitutionality of the use of permanent checkpoint 
stops to enforce Border Patrol.32 
In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court held 
consistently with the opinions set forth by the Fifth Circuit and found 
checkpoint stops of a fixed and permanent nature that detain motorists for brief 
questioning did not violate the Fourth Amendment and furthermore, that these 
types of fixed checkpoints did not require a judicial warrant.33  The Court 
arrived at this decision knowing that the checkpoint program authorized 
enforcement officials to stop particular vehicles where no individual suspicion 
of illegal aliens existed.  However, the Court did make clear that the holding in 
Martinez-Fuerte was narrow in scope and was limited only to the types of 
permanent checkpoints designed with the sole purpose of enforcing Border 
Patrol.34  The Court in Martinez-Fuerte justified its decision primarily on the 
strong national sentiment favoring a limited flow of illegal aliens into the 
country, and the Court recognized the accepted practice of limiting this flow by 
way of permanent, temporary, and roving checkpoints set up by the Border 
Patrol.35  The Court also found that the obvious and visible nature of the 
 
Jiminez-Garcia, the District Court granted Guillen’s and Medrano-Barragan’s motion to suppress.  
Id.  Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the Government appealed the granting of the 
motions to suppress in the decisions of Jiminez-Garcia and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan.  Id. 
 30. Id. at 549. 
 31. Id. at 550.  Petitioner Rodolfo Sifuentes was arrested at a permanent checkpoint near 
Sarita, Texas for transporting illegal aliens.  Id. at 549.  His motion to suppress the evidence 
derived from the stop was denied and he, like Martinez-Fuerte, was convicted after a jury trial.  
Id. at 550.  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction and found that these stops were 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
 32. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 550 n.6.  The conflict between the circuits centered on 
whether or not these checkpoints were in violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.  
Id. at 551.  The Ninth Circuit found that they were, and the Fifth Circuit found that they were not.  
Id. at 549, 550. 
 33. See id. at 549-50. 
 34. Id. at 567.  The Court concluded, “[A]ny further detention . . . must be based on consent 
or probable cause.”  Id. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) 
(alteration in original)). 
 35. Id. at 552. “It has been national policy for many years to limit immigration into the 
United States.”  Id. at 551.  The Court found that enforcing this limited flow into the country 
poses difficult law enforcement problems.  Id. at 552.  At the time this decision was handed 
down, despite Border Patrol’s efforts, the Court found illegal alien entry into the United States to 
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checkpoints36 combined with the minimal intrusion on time provided drivers 
with a warning and lessened the element of surprise for innocent travelers.37  
The Court reasoned the minimal interference, the absence of surprise, and the 
substantial government interest in retarding the influx of illegal immigration 
substantiated its decision to allow the permanent Border Patrol checkpoints to 
continue.38  The Court summarized: 
[T]he purpose of the stops is legitimate and in the public interest, and the need 
for this enforcement technique is demonstrated by the records in the cases 
before us.  Accordingly, we hold that the stops and questioning at issue may be 
made in the absence of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located 
checkpoints.39 
One reason Martinez-Fuerte made such an impact is that, although it had 
limited application, it still established an exception to the rule that 
individualized suspicion was a prerequisite for a seizure.40  The Court left no 
doubt in its opinion that the checkpoint did constitute a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, yet it still found that the governmental 
goals of the program and the negligible intrusion on the driver’s rights 
outweighed the individual’s Constitutional concerns.41  The Martinez-Fuerte 
decision paved the way for courts to carve out further exceptions to the general 
rule of individualized suspicion in cases involving vehicle checkpoints. 
B. The Supreme Court Elaborates Further in Delaware v. Prouse and Brown 
v. Texas 
The Supreme Court decided two important intervening cases between the 
time after the decision in Martinez-Fuerte and before the Court heard another 
fundamental roadblock case, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz.42  
The Court in Delaware v. Prouse recognized that states do have a substantial 
 
be a relatively easy task.  Id.  The Court thus reviewed techniques such as the permanent 
checkpoint, the temporary checkpoint, and even the roving patrol as necessary in policing this 
national dilemma.  Id. 
 36. Id. at 565.  The Court also used the visible manifestations of the checkpoint in 
comparison with a judicial warrant to reach the conclusion that a warrant was not required to 
operate these checkpoints.  Id. 
 37. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558-560.  The Court explained: “Selective referral may 
involve some annoyance, but it remains true that the stops should not be frightening or offensive 
because of their public and relatively routine nature.”  Id. at 560. 
 38. Id. at 558-561. 
 39. Id. at 562. 
 40. Id. at 561.  The checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte only constituted a seizure.  No search of 
the vehicle was involved. 
 41. Id.  The Court explained that an individual’s expectation of privacy in a vehicle is not as 
great as it is in the individual’s dwelling where the standards of the Fourth Amendment are at a 
heightened level.  Id. 
 42. 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
676 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:669 
interest in protecting licensing and registration laws,43 however, it found that 
interest was not substantial enough to justify roving patrol stops as an 
enforcement technique.44  The Court concluded that stopping a car to check for 
a license and registration when there was no reasonable suspicion to believe 
that the driver was violating any specific law constituted an unreasonable 
seizure.45  The Court found that “an individual operating or traveling in an 
automobile [should] not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply 
because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation[s]” 
and laws.46  The Fourth Amendment protection that an individual is afforded in 
a dwelling does not terminate when he leaves and enters a vehicle.47 
The Prouse decision reiterated the notion that police officers must have a 
reason based on objective facts before a stop is justified.48  According to the 
Court, an individual motorist has a reasonable expectation of privacy not to be 
subjected to arbitrary stops based on the unfettered “discretion of the [officers] 
in the field.”49  The Court further concluded: 
[E]xcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable 
suspicion that  a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, 
or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for 
violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to 
check his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.50 
However, the Court did leave open the possibility that a state could create 
“spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the 
unconstrained exercise of discretion.”51  Hence, the use of checkpoints to 
check every motorist’s license and registration according to a predetermined, 
objective plan would be constitutionally valid. 
 
 43. 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979).  In Prouse, the police stopped the respondent to check for a 
valid driver’s license and registration.  Id. at 650.  When respondent’s car was stopped, the police 
officer noticed marijuana in plain view on the car floor.  Id.  At the hearing for the respondent’s 
motion to suppress the evidence, the patrolman who pulled the car over testified that he did not 
observe any suspicious or unusual conduct by the driver beforehand.  Id. 
 44. Id. at 658-659. 
 45. Id. at 663. 
 46. Id. at 662. 
 47. Id. at 662-63. 
 48. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.  The Court recognized that the most effective method of 
enforcing traffic violations was “acting upon observed violations.”  Id. at 659. 
 49. Id. at 655. 
 50. Id. at 663.  Relying on the absence of empirical data in the case, the Court found that the 
“contribution to highway safety made by discretionary stops selected from among drivers 
generally will therefore be marginal at best.”  Id. at 660. 
 51. Id. at 663. 
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Brown v. Texas contributed to the roadblock analysis by providing a three-
part balancing test that determined the reasonableness of seizures.52  In Brown, 
the defendant was convicted of violating a Texas statute that made it a crime to 
refuse to identify one’s self to a police officer who had requested such 
information.53  When the officers detained Brown and asked for identification, 
they performed “a seizure of his person,” and were thus governed by the same 
Fourth Amendment principles as the roadblock cases.54  The Supreme Court 
found that the Texas statute violated the Fourth Amendment because there was 
no reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant had been doing anything 
criminal.55  In arriving at this conclusion, the Court used what is now known as 
the “Brown Balancing Test,” where the constitutionality of a seizure turns 
upon “a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, 
the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of 
the interference with individual liberty.”56  The “Brown Balancing Test” 
enforced the notion that seizures must be based on specific facts “indicating 
that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular 
individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying 
explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.”57  The 
Brown Court found no circumstances that should have led the police officer to 
reasonably suspect the defendant was about to participate in criminal activity.58  
Without objective facts and reasonable suspicion, an individual’s right to 
privacy must take precedence over the goal of general crime prevention.59 
C. A Variation on the Roadblock Cases: Michigan Department of State 
Police v. Sitz 
The status of roadblock jurisprudence remained fairly constant after the 
Prouse decision until numerous motorists brought an action in 1990 
challenging the constitutionality of a Michigan highway sobriety checkpoint 
 
 52. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). 
 53. Id. at 49-50.  In Brown, two police officers observed the defendant and another man 
walking away from one another in an alley in an area that was known for high drug activity.  Id. 
at 48.  The officers stopped the defendant and asked him to identify himself and tell the officers 
what he was doing.  Id. at 48-49.  One officer testified that “the situation ‘looked suspicious and 
we had never seen that subject in that area before.’”  Id. 
 54. Id. at 50. 
 55. Id. at 52. 
 56. Id. at 50-51. 
 57. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. 
 58. Id. at 51-52.  The Court reasoned that there was no indication that it was unusual for 
people to be in the alley where defendant was found.  Id. at 52.  Also, the mere fact that the 
defendant was in an area of high crime does not automatically vilify him.  Id. 
 59. Id. at 52. 
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program.60  The District Court engaged in the balancing test created by Brown 
v. Texas to make its original determination that this program violated the 
Fourth Amendment.61  Using the balancing test, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the District Court’s findings that Michigan did have a serious interest in 
curbing drinking and driving, that sobriety checkpoint programs are generally 
ineffective, and that the intrusion on an individual’s privacy rights was 
substantial.62  The legal issue that the Supreme Court faced in Sitz involved the 
constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints generally.63  In the majority opinion 
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the 
Constitution does not prohibit a state’s use of highway sobriety checkpoints.64  
The Court made this decision even though these sobriety checkpoints 
functioned without the traditionally mandated individualized suspicion. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court decided that the lower courts had 
misapplied the “Brown Balancing Test” in analyzing the reasonableness of the 
sobriety checkpoints.65  Both courts found that the first prong of the test was 
easily satisfied.  Similar to the line of reasoning used in Martinez-Fuerte, the 
Court relied heavily on the public policy justification for legalizing the 
Michigan checkpoints.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “No one can seriously 
dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in 
eradicating it . . . . Conversely, the weight bearing on the other scale—the 
measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints—
is slight.”66  The Court did not agree with the lower court’s interpretation of the 
“effectiveness” prong.  The Supreme Court looked to the empirical data to 
justify the program, but also determined that this prong “was not meant to 
transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to 
 
 60. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).  According to the Michigan 
guidelines, these sobriety checkpoints were set up at selected locations along various state roads.  
Id. at 447.  All vehicles passing through a checkpoint would then be stopped and the drivers 
would be examined for signs of intoxication.  Id.  If an officer suspected a motorist was 
intoxicated, he was directed out of the traffic flow for further questioning and further sobriety 
tests.  Id. 
 61. Id. at 448-49.  “[T]he test involved ‘balancing the state’s interest in preventing accidents 
caused by drunk drivers, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal, and the 
level of intrusion on an individual’s privacy caused by the checkpoints.’” Id. (citing Sitz v. Mich. 
Dep’t of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 439 (1988).  The Court of Appeals agreed with the 
District Court that “the Brown three-prong balancing test was the correct test to be used to 
determine the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint plan.” Id. (citing Sitz, 170 Mich. App. at 
439). 
 62. Id. at 449. 
 63. Id. at 450.  The Court noted, “We address only the initial stop of each motorist passing 
through a checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint 
officers.”  Id. at 450-51. 
 64. Id. at 447. 
 65. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. 
 66. Id. at 451. 
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which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be 
employed to deal with a serious public danger.”67  Another point of 
disagreement was the third and final prong of the “Brown Balancing Test.”  
The Court agreed that the objective intrusion of the stops (only a few seconds) 
was minimal, but it also held that the sobriety checkpoints were not unduly 
burdensome on the “subjective intrusion” element of the test68 and did not rise 
to the level of being a Fourth Amendment violation as the lower courts 
contended.69  The Court reasoned that the motorist’s level of surprise or fear 
should have been reduced by some degree after witnessing the visible 
manifestations of the approaching checkpoint.70  Hence, the Court arrived at its 
decision reversing the lower courts and concluding that the benefit to be gained 
from these sobriety checkpoints in combating the state’s drunk-driving 
problem outweighed the slight “subjective intrusion” on the motorist and did 
not violate the motorists’ Fourth Amendment rights.71 
D. The Missouri Supreme Court Offers a Pre-Edmond Opinion in State v. 
Damask 
The case of State v. Damask is especially notable because in it, the 
Missouri Supreme Court created yet another exception to the Fourth 
Amendment individualized suspicion rule by upholding the use of roadblocks 
designed for the sole purpose of intercepting drug trafficking.72  The operation 
of the Damask checkpoint was simplistic, yet extremely deceptive in 
 
 67. Id. at 453.  The language from Brown v. Texas refers to the “effectiveness” aspect as “the 
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest.”  Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.  In examining 
the second prong of the “Brown Balancing Test,” the Sitz Court analyzed and compared the 1.5% 
“hit rate” of the Michigan checkpoints to the 0.5% “hit rate” that was approved in Martinez-
Fuerte.  Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454-55. 
 68. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.  The subjective intrusion element in Sitz referenced the fear and 
surprise element of “law-abiding motorists” not “the natural fear of one who has been drinking.”  
Id. 
 69. Id. at 455.  The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals, which had found the 
level of “subjective intrusion” to be substantial, had misinterpreted previous cases concerning the 
“degree of ‘subjective intrusion’ and the potential for generating fear and surprise.”  Id. at 452.  
The Court held in Martinez-Fuerte that unlike roving patrols, which operated at night and on 
seldom-used roads, permanent checkpoints are less frightening to motorists.  “At traffic 
checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped . . . can see visible signs of 
the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.”  
Id. at 452-53 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558).  The Supreme Court in 
Sitz found the level of intrusion resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint 
indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops upheld in Martinez-Fuerte.  Id. at 453. 
 70. Id. at 453. 
 71. Id. at 455. 
 72. 936 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).  See also Scott A. White, The 
Constitutionality of Drug Enforcement Checkpoints in Missouri, 63 MO. L. REV. 263 (1998). 
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practice.73  The law enforcement technique used in Damask was a classic 
illustration of a “ruse checkpoint.”  Defendant Richard Damask fell victim to 
this ruse checkpoint and was arrested after a drug-sniffing dog smelled 
marijuana in Damask’s trunk.74  After the trial court sustained Damask’s 
motion to suppress the evidence, the state then brought an interlocutory appeal, 
and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the checkpoint operation violated 
Damask’s Fourth Amendment rights.75 
Much like the Sitz case, the critical legal issue facing the Missouri 
Supreme Court in Damask was the constitutionality of the initial vehicle 
seizure at the checkpoint.76  All parties conceded that the checkpoint stop was 
a seizure and therefore, it must have operated according to the requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment.77  As the Supreme Court did in the Sitz case,78 the 
Damask majority relied heavily on the “Brown Balancing Test.”79  In applying 
the first factor of the “Brown Balancing Test,” the Missouri Supreme Court 
concluded that the prevention of drug trafficking was certainly a legitimate 
governmental interest and that the severity of that interest could hardly be 
 
 73. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 568.  The Franklin County Sheriff’s Department “placed two 
signs that read ‘DRUG ENFORCEMENT CHECKPOINT 1 MILE AHEAD’ approximately one-
quarter mile west of exit 242, on both sides of the eastbound lanes of I-44.”  Id.  These 
checkpoints attempted to put an end to drug trafficking along I-44, a popular drug transportation 
route.  Id.  Exit 242 was a remote area and according to the State, there were few valid reasons for 
non-local residents to take the exit.  Id.  “Contrary to the [highway’s postings,] the sheriff’s 
[department] set up the checkpoint at the top of the eastbound exit 242 ramp.”  Id.  Eastbound 
cars taking the 242 exit climbed the ramp, “came to [a] stop sign, and found a uniformed officer 
waiting.”  Id.  The officer then approached the car, asked for a license and registration, and 
inquired as to the reason for why the motorist exited the highway.  Id.  If the motorist’s answer 
was reasonable, he was allowed to proceed.  Id.  If the answer was unreasonable, or if there was 
reason to suspect drug trafficking, the officer then asked for permission to search the vehicle.  Id.  
If consent was not granted, a drug-sniffing dog circled the vehicle.  Id. 
 74. Id.  At about 4:20 a.m. on November 22, 1996, Damask’s Mercury Marquis bearing 
Nevada license plates passed through the checkpoint.  Upon being asked why he exited, Damask 
answered that he was turning around to go back and get something to eat.  However, officers 
noticed fast food bags in the car and a warm cup of coffee.  Damask did not grant the officers 
consent to search the car, so the police dog performed an exterior “sniff” of the car.  Inside 
Damask’s trunk, officers found a bag containing marijuana.  Id. 
 75. Id. at 568-69. 
 76. Id. at 570. 
 77. Id. at 570.  The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  “Generally, seizures that are not based upon a particularized suspicion of criminal 
activity are [presumed to be] unreasonable.” Id. at 570-71. 
 78. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
 79. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).  “The reasonableness of a seizure that is less 
intrusive than a traditional arrest depends on the balance between the public interest in preventing 
criminal activity and the individual’s right to be free from arbitrary interference by law officers.”  
Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 571. 
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questioned.80  The Missouri Supreme Court looked to a prior Washington D.C. 
case, Galberth v. United States,81 for assistance in applying the second prong 
of the test.  The Damask court ultimately rejected the Galbreth notion that 
checkpoints such as the one in Martinez-Fuerte to control illegal immigration 
are any different than the checkpoints set up to halt drug trafficking.82  The 
court decided that the checkpoint in Damask passed the second prong of the 
Brown test so long as the checkpoint was “substantially similar to prior 
successful checkpoints.”83  Finally, the court also ruled that both the objective 
and subjective intrusion on an individual’s rights was minimal and therefore 
passed the third prong of the Brown balancing test.84  The objective test was 
passed because the duration of the stops lasted for an average of two minutes.85  
The checkpoint also survived the subjective test because the program was 
governed by a clear, strict plan that removed all discretion from the officers 
who ran it.86  Following the Brown analysis, the Missouri Supreme Court held 
that the Damask checkpoints were not unreasonable and thus did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment rights of Mr. Damask.87 
E. The United States Supreme Court Attempts to End the Roadblock 
Ambiguity with City of Indianapolis v. Edmond 
The operation of the vehicle checkpoint program in Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, like most other of the roadblock programs, was relatively 
straightforward.  At each checkpoint location, approximately thirty 
Indianapolis police officers were present to stop a predetermined number of 
 
 80. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 571.  The Damask court stated, “Drug trafficking has created a 
‘veritable national crisis in law enforcement’ and is ‘one of the greatest problems affecting the 
health and welfare of our population.’” Id. (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 
U.S. 531, 538 (1985); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. VonRaab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)). 
 81. 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  The defendant in Damask relied on Galbreth for the 
proposition that a checkpoint set up for the primary purpose of drug interdiction, unlike sobriety 
and immigration control, fails the second prong of the Brown test and is not considered a 
sufficient public interest because it fails to “promote a government interest separate from that of 
general law enforcement.” Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 572. 
 82. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 572-73. 
 83. Id. at 573.  The court held: 
[I]f the State can show generally that similar checkpoint operations effectively advanced 
the State’s interests, and that the particular checkpoint in question was substantially 
similar to prior successful checkpoints, this is sufficient evidence from which a reviewing 
court can determine the effectiveness of checkpoint operations under Brown.  Thus, if 
similar checkpoints discover ‘problems [illegal drug trafficking] predictably associated 
with persons stopped at roadblocks,’ Brown’s second prong is satisfied. 
Id. at 573 (alteration in original). 
 84. Id. at 573-74. 
 85. Id. at 574. 
 86. Id. at 574-75. 
 87. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 575. 
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vehicles.88  At least one officer approached each car after the driver was 
stopped and advised the driver as to the purpose of the checkpoint.89  The 
officers conducted each of these searches in the “same manner until 
particularized suspicion develop[ed].”90  The individual police officers had no 
discretion to vary the procedure or the sequence of the vehicles they stopped.91 
In August 1998, the city of Indianapolis began to operate these checkpoints 
on Indianapolis roadways with the primary purpose of reducing the amount of 
unlawful drugs transported in motor vehicles.92  The city conducted six such 
roadblocks between the months of August and November of that year, stopping 
a total of 1,161 vehicles and arresting one hundred and four motorists.93  The 
resulting figures totaled an overall “hit rate” of approximately nine percent.94 
According to the affidavit of Indianapolis Police Sergeant Marshall 
DePew, the locations of these checkpoints were selected weeks in advance and 
took into account such factors as local area crime statistics and traffic 
volume.95  The Indianapolis checkpoints were usually conducted in the 
daylight hours and were identified with bold signs that stated, “NARCOTICS 
CHECKPOINT MILE AHEAD, NARCOTICS K-9 IN USE, BE PREPARED 
TO STOP.”96 
 
 88. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000). 
 89. Id.  The officer then proceeded to ask the driver for his or her driver’s license and vehicle 
registration.  Id.  The officer was also on the lookout for any suspicious “signs of impairment,” 
while conducting an “open-view examination of the vehicle from the outside.”  Id.  While the 
officer was doing this, a drug-sniffing dog circled the outside of the vehicle.  Id.  Particularized 
suspicion was established when the officers noticed any suspicious behavior or received any hints 
from the trained drug-sniffing dog.  Id. 
 90. Id. at 35. 
 91. Id.  The city mandated that each seizure was to be conducted according to a standard 
procedure and each search was to be performed either by consent or by the requisite amount of 
suspicion.  Id.  The city agreed that absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause, each stop 
would last less than five minutes.  Id. 
 92. See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 93. Id.  Of these one hundred and four arrests, fifty-five of them were for drug-related 
crimes, and forty-nine of the arrests were for non-drug-related crimes.  Id. 
 94. Id.  Subsequent to the Edmond decision, the Missouri Supreme Court in Mack found this 
nine percent “hit rate” inadequate to create the necessary level of individualized suspicion that 
makes a seizure reasonable.  “Whatever the average hit rate may be in Missouri ruse checkpoints, 
it is clear that it is not sufficient to make them more than just another police technique; it is not 
enough to elevate ruse checkpoints to the next level, so that the ruse itself creates the kind of 
individualized suspicion required by Edmond.”  State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 716 (Mo. 2002) 
(en banc). 
 95. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35. 
 96. Id. at 35-36.  Unlike Mack, the Indianapolis checkpoint was not a ruse and did not try to 
trick motorists.  The actual checkpoint was located exactly where the posted sign said it was.  See 
Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 709. 
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Respondents James Edmond and Joell Palmer were both stopped at the 
Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint in late September 1998.97  Respondents 
contended that such checkpoints violated their Fourth Amendment rights.98  
The petitioners conceded that the primary purpose of the Indianapolis 
checkpoint program was to disrupt the flow of illegal narcotics in the city.99  
Using the primary purpose of the checkpoint as a decisive factor in its 
decision, the Supreme Court stated that “[w]e have never approved a 
checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary 
criminal wrongdoing.  Rather, our checkpoint cases have recognized only 
limited exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by 
some measure of individualized suspicion.”100  The State attempted to persuade 
the Court that the Indianapolis checkpoint had a valid secondary purpose of 
checking licenses and registrations, yet the Court quickly dismissed the State’s 
argument, recognizing the dangers that would accompany justifying 
checkpoints based on so-called “secondary purposes.”101 
Each of the previous checkpoint cases that had been approved by the Court 
dealt primarily with issues such as policing the national border or ensuring 
roadway safety, not general crime prevention.102  After the State’s attempt to 
highlight the similarities between its facts and those found in Martinez-Fuerte 
and Sitz, the Court found: 
If we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there would be little 
check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any 
conceivable law enforcement purpose. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment would do 
little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American 
life.103 
 
 97. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 36.  Both “[r]espondents then filed a lawsuit on behalf of 
themselves and the class of [] motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being 
stopped . . . at the Indianapolis drug checkpoints.”  Id. 
 98. Id.  Respondents also contended that these checkpoints violated “the search and seizure 
provision of the Indiana Constitution.”  Id. 
 99. Id. at 40-41.  “In their stipulation of facts, the parties repeatedly refer to the checkpoints 
as ‘drug checkpoints’ and describe them as ‘being operated by the City of Indianapolis in an 
effort to interdict unlawful drugs in Indianapolis.’”  Id. 
 100. Id. at 41. 
 101. Id. at 46.  This is known as the “mixed-motive” argument.  If the Court had given 
credence to this argument, the door would be left open for any conceivable type of checkpoint so 
long as there was a legitimate purpose attached. Id. 
 102. Of course, the State in Edmond put forth arguments attempting to compare its facts with 
those in both Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz.  The State argued that all three cases had designs to 
“arrest[] those suspected of committing crimes.”  Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.  The State also 
compared the severity of the drug problem to that of drunken-driving in Sitz and to that of illegal 
immigration in Martinez-Fuerte.  The Court ultimately disposed of all of the State’s contentions.  
Id. 
 103. Id. at 42. 
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The Court continued that, “when law enforcement authorities pursue primarily 
general crime control purposes at checkpoints such as here, however, stops can 
only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion.”104  The Court 
further provided that it would not “sanction stops justified only by the 
generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may 
reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime.”105 
After a detailed tour of the historical checkpoint jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the Indianapolis checkpoints, unlike those 
approved of in the past, violated the Fourth Amendment because their purpose 
was “indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.”106  The 
Court was clear, however, that its decision did not change the Martinez-Fuerte 
or Sitz holdings in any way, but that any checkpoints with general crime 
control goals must still operate under the governing principles of the Fourth 
Amendment’s required amounts of individualized suspicion.107 
F. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Affirms the U.S. Supreme Court with 
a Slight Variation on Edmond 
In a case filed on October 7, 2002,108 the Eigth Circuit Court of Appeals 
entered its own decision on the ruse checkpoint issue in United States v. 
Yousif.109  The facts of the Yousif case were almost identical to those of both 
Damask and State v. Mack.110  The location of the Yousif checkpoint was 
chosen because of police suspicion that Interstate 44 was being used to 
transport large volumes of narcotics.  The “Sugar Tree” checkpoint location 
was also selected because it was a little-used route for commercial or local 
traffic.111  The operation of the Sugar Tree checkpoint ran according to 
standards issued by the Missouri Highway Patrol.112  The checkpoint system, 
except for its deceptive nature, operated almost identically to the checkpoint in 
 
 104. Id. at 47. 
 105. Id. at 44. 
 106. Id. at 48. 
 107. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47. 
 108. Note that this decision came out after Mack.  This case is offered here to provide support 
to the thesis that ruse checkpoints should be abolished altogether. 
 109. 308 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2002) 
 110. In Yousif, the Phelps County Sheriff’s Department set up a ruse checkpoint at the end of 
the exit ramp leading uphill from eastbound Interstate 44 to Sugar Tree Road in Phelps County, 
Missouri.  Yousif, 308 F.3d at 823.  The checkpoint was classified as a ruse checkpoint because 
signs were visible along the highway, alerting motorists to an approaching drug checkpoint, 
whereas in reality, the checkpoint was located on the ramp that exited the highway a short 
distance past the warning signs.  Id. at 823. 
 111. Yousif, 308 F.3d at 823.  The location of the ruse checkpoint was chosen for almost the 
exact same reasons.  Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 707. 
 112. Yousif, 308 F.3d at 823. 
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Indianapolis v. Edmond.113  On April 13, 2000, Salwan Yousif drove his rented 
Ford Explorer into the Sugar Tree Road checkpoint.114  After a Missouri 
Highway Patrolman picked up on a very strong berry-like odor, he asked 
Yousif and his wife for consent to search the Ford Explorer.115  The search 
produced large amounts of marijuana.116 
The district court denied Yousif’s motion to suppress the evidence and 
adopted the magistrate judge’s decision, which concluded that the Sugar Tree 
Road checkpoint did not violate Yousif’s Fourth Amendment rights, and that 
Yousif’s consent to the search was voluntary.117  However, shortly after the 
district court made its decision, the United States Supreme Court handed down 
its landmark decision in Edmond, which held that similar drug interdiction 
roadside checkpoints were violative of an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights because they allowed seizures without the requisite amount of 
individualized suspicion.118 
Even after learning of the Edmond decision, the magistrate judge again 
denied Yousif’s motion to suppress.119  Though the magistrate judge believed 
there was enough individualized suspicion to distinguish the case from 
Edmond, the district court disagreed, and held the Sugar Tree Road checkpoint 
to be “‘clearly illegal’ under Edmond.”120  The district court continued, “[a]ll 
of these indicators . . . Defendant’s initial hesitation . . . nervousness and 
shaking . . . and the overwhelming berry-scented air freshener, would not exist 
 
 113. “When a vehicle would arrive at the [Sugar Tree Road] checkpoint, at least one 
uniformed officer would approach the driver and ask for his or her driver’s license, registration, 
and—if required by the state of registration—proof of insurance.  The officer would also record 
the license plate number” and would inquire as to why the motorist exited the highway.  Id. at 
823-24.  If the officer had suspicions about the driver, the officer would ask for consent to search 
the vehicle.  Id. at 824.  If consent was denied and reasonable suspicion continued, the officer 
would ask the driver and any other occupants to get out of the vehicle while a drug dog circled the 
vehicle.  Id. 
 114. Id. at 824. 
 115. Id.  The Ford Explorer had Oklahoma plates, and when questioned by the police, Yousif 
produced an Arizona driver’s license and a rental agreement for the vehicle.  Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Yousif, 308 F.3d at 825. 
 118. Id.  See also Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47. 
 119. Yousif, 308 F.3d at 825.  The magistrate judge held this case to be distinguishable from 
Edmond, finding that the police did have the requisite degree of individualized suspicion to make 
the search.  Id.  The magistrate judge pointed to Yousif’s conduct in approaching the checkpoint 
to illustrate the basis for the suspicion.  Id.  According to the judge, factors such as exiting the 
highway in the first place, stopping his vehicle half-way up the ramp, and driving a vehicle with 
out-of-town plates all indicated that Yousif might have been attempting to avoid this checkpoint.  
Id. at 825-26. 
 120. Id. at 826. The district court held that “the Supreme Court’s holding in Edmond could 
not be ‘avoided’ simply by relying on ‘factual indicators’ which purportedly established 
individualized reasonable suspicion that Yousif was transporting drugs.”  Id. 
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but for the illegal checkpoint.”121  The district court agreed with the 
magistrate’s opinion that Yousif’s voluntary consent was an independent basis 
for denying the motion to suppress.122 
On appeal, Yousif argued that the district court erred in denying his motion 
to suppress by contending: 
[T]he apparent consent he gave . . . and his apparent waiver of Miranda 
rights . . . were not sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful seizure to purge 
the taint of the constitutional violation.  Therefore . . . the marijuana 
discovered . . . [was] fruit[] of the poisonous tree and subject to exclusion.123 
For the same reasons that the Supreme Court found the Indianapolis 
checkpoints unconstitutional, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found 
the Sugar Tree Road ruse checkpoint unconstitutional.  Like the checkpoint in 
Edmond, the primary purpose of the Sugar Tree Road checkpoint was the 
interdiction of drug trafficking.124  Using the same reasoning that was used by 
the dissent in Mack, the Court of Appeals stated, “while some drivers may 
have wanted to avoid being caught for drug trafficking, many more took the 
exit for wholly innocent reasons—such as wanting to avoid the inconvenience 
and delay.”125  Borrowing from the majority’s logic in Edmond, the Court of 
Appeals continued, “a quantum of individualized suspicion only after a stop 
occurs cannot justify the stop itself.”126  The Court of Appeals reversed the 
decision of the district court, declared that the Sugar Tree checkpoint 
unconstitutional, and remanded the case for further proceedings.127 
III.  WHAT ALL THE FUSS IS ABOUT: THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT THROWS 
A CURVEBALL IN STATE V. MACK 
On February 13, 2002, the Supreme Court of Missouri reached what many 
would consider a surprising decision when it reversed the trial court’s decision 
to suppress evidence confiscated by police while operating a ruse checkpoint.  
The court faced essentially the same Fourth Amendment issues that the United 
States Supreme Court faced in Edmond.128  The underlying facts of Mack are 
the same as those that courts have seen numerous times before in the so-called 
“ruse checkpoint” cases.129 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 826-27. 
 123. Id. at 827. 
 124. Yousif, 308 F.3d at 827. 
 125. Id. at 827-28. 
 126. Id. at 828 (emphasis in original). 
 127. Id. at 832. 
 128. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 129. See Yousif, 308 F.3d at 824; United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2000); Bass 
v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 921 (Va. 2000); State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1997). 
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On June 24, 1999, the City of Troy Police Department established a drug 
checkpoint on northbound Highway 61 at the Old Cap Au Gris exit in Lincoln 
County, Missouri.130  The Old Cap Au Gris exit had no gas stations or 
restaurants, and the police believed that the only conceivable reasons for a 
traveler to take this exit “would be to go to a local high school, a local Catholic 
church, or one of several residences in the area.”131  The drug checkpoint 
consisted of a sign posted on the highway approximately one quarter of a mile 
from the Old Cap Au Gris exit, which read “DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
CHECKPOINT ONE MILE AHEAD” and “POLICE DRUG DOGS 
WORKING.”132  This checkpoint was a ploy because it led drivers to believe 
that the drug checkpoint was located at the Highway 47 exit further down the 
road, when in reality the checkpoint was located at the Old Cap Au Gris exit.  
Believing the checkpoint was at the Highway 47 exit, unsuspecting motorists 
would exit at Old Cap Au Gris and drive right into the police trap.133 
The Troy police conducted their checkpoints according to guidelines that 
were similar to those established by the Indianapolis Police Department in 
Edmond.134  The police were instructed that motorists had no valid reason to 
take the Old Cap Au Gris exit on the night in question.  If police questioning 
revealed no circumstances that warranted reasonable suspicion of drug 
trafficking, the motorist was released.135  If the officers did have reasonable 
suspicion that the motorists possessed narcotics, they directed the vehicle to 
the entrance side of the ramp, where one of the officers sought permission to 
search the car.136 
Respondent Mack took the Old Cap Au Gris exit at approximately 11:00 
p.m. on June 24 and was stopped by the Troy police officers.137  At the 
suppression hearing, one of the officers described his first contact with Mack 
as “the most obvious veering off of 61 all night.  The vehicle . . . almost missed 
the turn.  He was going northbound on 61 and all of a suddenly [sic] veered off 
 
 130. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 707.  The Missouri Supreme Court noted that the police chose this 
particular exit because they believed there was no legitimate reason for a motorist to take that 
particular exit on that particular night.  Id. 
 131. Id.  The police determined that there were no activities that Thursday night at the high 
school or the church, and therefore, believed the exit to be an ideal location to set up their 
checkpoint.  Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. The Troy police were stationed at the top of the ramp and were instructed to stop all 
exiting vehicles, record the driver’s license number and registration, and ascertain the motorists’ 
reason for exiting.  Id. 
 135. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 707. 
 136. Id.  If the driver did not grant the officers permission, a drug dog was used to detect the 
presence of any narcotics.  Id. 
 137. Id. 
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onto the off ramp.”138  The officer continued in more detail by testifying, “I 
remember seeing a vehicle coming toward me which would have been 
northbound 61.  It appeared it was going to continue past the off ramp.  And 
suddenly it shot over and almost missing it came up the off ramp.  And he was 
moving at a pretty good pace too.”139 
Mack told officers that he had exited at Old Cap Au Gris to get to a bar in 
Troy.140  Once at the checkpoint, the officers observed that Mack was “very 
nervous, had glazed and bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol.”141  Mack 
allowed the police to search his car, and they discovered various illegal 
narcotics under the driver’s seat.  Mack was charged with possession of 
methamphetamine, cocaine, and methylphenidate.142 
A. The Missouri Supreme Court distinguishes Mack from Edmond 
The Respondent in Mack presented the obvious argument that Edmond 
controlled the case, and that his motion to suppress should have been granted 
accordingly.143  The State of Missouri, on the other hand, contended that the 
checkpoints involved were “fundamentally different” than those set up in 
Indianapolis.144  The State argued that the requisite level of “individualized 
suspicion” necessary to allow a checkpoint to pass constitutional muster was 
present.145  The Missouri Supreme Court agreed with the State, found that 
Mack was distinguishable from Edmond, and concluded that the checkpoints 
were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.146  The decision in Mack thus 
turned on the same legal issue as Edmond— whether or not the checkpoints in 
question generated the “necessary quantum of individualized suspicion” to 
make them reasonable and thus, constitutional.147  The Mack majority 
recognized that a police officer normally must observe some type of unusual 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 707. 
 140. Mack, 665.W.3d at 707.  The dissent determined that a motorist could have used this exit 
to get to the bar to which Mack was headed.  Id. at 718 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. at 708. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 709. 
 145. Mack, 66 S.W.3d. at 709. 
 146. Id. at 709-10.  The court in Mack recounted the facts in Edmond.  There, a predetermined 
number of cars at each checkpoint were stopped at random and there was no attempt to aquire 
individualized suspicion before making any of the stops.  Id. at 709.  The majority in Mack 
reasoned that, unlike in Edmond, the entire purpose of the Mack checkpoint was to “generate the 
suspicious conduct necessary to constitute ‘individualized suspicion,’ and this was done by 
deceiving drivers who were engaged in criminal activity into exiting the highway so as to avoid 
the checkpoint they expected to encounter at the next exit.”  Id. 
 147. Id. at 709. 
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conduct, “which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience 
that criminal activity may be afoot,” before justifying this type of seizure.148 
The majority opinion in Mack found it was logical that drivers with 
something to hide, such as drugs in the car, would avoid the drug checkpoint at 
all costs and exit at the nearest available off-ramp.149  The majority also relied 
on the fact that there was allegedly no other legitimate reason for motorists to 
take the Old Cap Au Gris exit on the night police operated the checkpoints.150  
The court also accepted the State’s contention that these types of ruse 
checkpoints have a lofty success rate because most drivers with drugs in their 
cars usually “take the bait.”151  Without explicitly applying the “Brown 
Balancing Test,” the majority also analyzed the second effectiveness prong of 
the test by recognizing that these checkpoints were set up in an identical 
manner to those that have been found to be successful in the past.152 
The final, and possibly the most convincing, reason behind the majority’s 
ruling was Mack’s conduct in taking the Old Cap Au Gris exit.153  According 
to one officer’s testimony, Mack “suddenly veered off onto the off ramp” and 
“almost missed the turn,” leading the officer little choice but to infer that Mack 
had made a last-ditch effort to avoid the drug checkpoint.154  The majority held 
that this particular conduct, coupled with the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the checkpoint’s premise, certainly constituted the requisite 
amount of “individualized suspicion” necessary to be classified as 
“reasonable.”155  This particularized conduct formed the basis of the majority’s 
refutation of the dissent’s argument that this case is indistinguishable from 
United States v. Green,156 where that court held that checkpoints similar to the 
ones in Mack constituted an unreasonable seizure.157 
 
 148. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 
 149. Id. at 709. The nearest available off-ramp in Mack was the Old Cap Au Gris exit, and 
hence an effective trap was laid.  Id. at 707. 
 150. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 707.  The majority wrote, “the checkpoint was set up in an isolated 
and sparsely populated area offering no services to motorists and was conducted on an evening 
that would otherwise have little traffic.”  Id.  The court also added that the defendant took the exit 
at 11:00 p.m., a time when there is normally even less traffic on the local roads.  Id. 
 151. Id. at 709. 
 152. Id. (citing State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 573 (Mo. 1997)).  Damask referenced the 
success rate of this police tactic as part of the rationale for its legitimacy.  Id. 
 153. Id. at 709-10.  See also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275-77 (2002).  The Mack 
majority relied on the reasoning in Arvizu when it took into consideration Mack’s conduct in 
exiting the highway.  Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 709-10.  The Court in Arvizu found that courts must 
look to the “the totality of the circumstances.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. 
 154. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 710. 
 155. Id. at 710. 
 156. 275 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 157. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 710 (citing United States v. Green, 275 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2001)).  
The majority in Mack found the case to be distinguishable from Green because in Green, there 
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B. The Mack Dissent Stays True to Edmond 
The Court in Edmond realized and appreciated the danger and severity of 
drugs and drug-related activity in this country; however, it went on to find that, 
“the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning 
what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given 
purpose.”158  The Mack dissent agreed and cited numerous cases decided both 
before and after Edmond declaring these ruse checkpoints unconstitutional.159 
The dissent began by comparing the facts in Mack with those in some of 
the pre-Edmond decisions.  Two cases in particular, State v. Damask and 
Galberth v. United States, factored largely in the dissent’s reasoning.  The 
dissent stressed that the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Damask, which 
approved the use of checkpoints such as the one in Mack for the purpose of 
preventing drug-related crimes, was in direct conflict with Edmond.160  In 
Damask, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the Galberth reasoning and 
equated the approval of border checkpoints with an approval of roadway 
checkpoints for the principal purpose of deterring general criminal activity.161  
However, the dissent urged that the Galberth outcome should be the rule 
because it was consistent with Edmond, holding ruse checkpoints to be 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.162  The Missouri Supreme Court 
in Damask even held, “[b]ut for the illegal immigration cases, one might agree 
that Galberth correctly states the law.”163 
The dissent referenced the recent Eighth Circuit decision in United States 
v. Green, which explicitly held that a ruse checkpoint similar to the one used in 
Mack violated the Fourth Amendment guidelines stressed in Edmond.164  The 
 
was no additional evidence of the requisite individualized suspicion, whereas in Mack, Mack 
almost missed the turn and veered suddenly off the highway.  Id. at 710. 
 158. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000). 
 159. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 711-12 (Stith, J., dissenting).  The dissent cited cases invalidating 
general criminal checkpoints, such as People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d 419 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), and 
pre-Edmond cases with similar holdings, United States v. Morales-Zamora, 974 F.2d 149 (10th 
Cir. 1992); Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
 160. Mack, 66 S.W. 3d at 712 (Stith, J., dissenting).  The dissent noted that “in Damask this 
Court considered the reasoning of Galberth, . . . that police may not use a checkpoint to seek 
evidence of drug-related crimes, but rejected that reasoning because it believed . . . that the 
United States Supreme Court’s approval of border patrol checkpoints in United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte constituted approval of roadway checkpoints for the purpose of deterring 
criminal activity.”  Id. 
 161. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court did not rule according to the Galberth decision, which 
held that police could not use such suspicionless checkpoints.  Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 572 (Mo. 1997). 
 164. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 712-13 (Stith, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Green, 275 F.3d 
694, 697-700 (8th Cir. 2001)).  The checkpoint program in Green operated under the same ruse 
premise as the one in Mack.  Id. at 712.  In Green, one defendant consented to a search of his car 
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Green court ruled in conformity with the Edmond holding and found that 
checkpoints used for general crime prevention were not constitutional.165  The 
Mack dissent also relied on an earlier case, which actually foreshadowed some 
of the reasoning that the Supreme Court would later apply in Edmond.  United 
States v. Huguenin also involved a checkpoint warning similar to the one found 
in Mack, which notified drivers of a drug/DUI checkpoint at an approaching 
exit.166  The Huguenin court reasoned, 
[The police] did not attempt to minimize the fear and surprise potentially 
experienced by motorists, but specifically attempted to increase surprise.  An 
ordinary law-abiding citizen, who perhaps took the exit simply to avoid the 
unusual process of being stopped on an Interstate highway, could fear that he 
would be under greater suspicion and subject to more intrusive questions and a 
thorough search of his car simply because he had chosen to take the exit.167 
The Mack dissent suggested that the ruse checkpoint used in Huguenin “caused 
greater Fourth Amendment concern because its surreptitious nature resulted in 
unreasonable and unnecessary surprise on the part of law-abiding 
motorists.”168  After discussing both the constitutionality of the mixed-motive 
purpose of the checkpoint 169 and its excessive level of subjective intrusion, the 
 
at a drug enforcement checkpoint.  Drugs were found in the car.  Defendants brought a Fourth 
Amendment challenge to the admission of evidence resulting from the stop and subsequent search 
of the car at the drug checkpoint.  Green, 275 F.3d at 697-98. 
 165. Green, 275 F.3d at 699-700. 
 166. United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 549 (6th Cir. 1998).  The Tennessee Sheriff’s 
Department had established this checkpoint as a ruse to stop motorists who chose to exit off the 
highway after viewing the warning signs.  Although the two signs posted on eastbound I-40 read 
“DRUG-DUI ENFORCEMENT CHECK POINT 1/2 MILE AHEAD,” the officers had no 
checkpoint in place on the highway at that location.  Id.  Rather, the police set up a checkpoint at 
the end of the Airport Road exit ramp, which was the first exit available to motorists after the 
posted signs.  Id.  The Airport Road exit was not frequently used because no services were 
offered at the exit.  Id.  Motorists were unaware of the roadblock at the end of the ramp until they 
came around a curve approximately 50 to 100 yards into exit ramp.  Id.  After a motorist exited, 
there was no way to avoid the checkpoint because it was illegal to back down the ramp.  Id. 
 167. Id. at 561. 
 168. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 711 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 169. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 556-59.  There was a dispute about whether the checkpoint’s 
primary purpose was to prevent drunken driving or to intercept narcotics.  After analyzing the 
Whren and Merrett decisions as well as other mixed-motive cases, the court ultimately held that 
the primary purpose of the program was to detect narcotics and that the checkpoint could not be 
ruled constitutional simply because another purpose was to detect drunken driving.  Id. at 559.  
The court found that “[t]he problem with mixed-motive checkpoints is that they allow law 
enforcement officers the opportunity to use a pretext to question and search for contraband 
without probable cause, conduct the Supreme Court consistently has frowned upon.”  Id. at 557.  
For a discussion on mixed-motive purposes and pretextual stops, see Whren v. United States, 517 
U.S. 806, 816 (1996) and Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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Huguenin court concluded that the ruse checkpoints were not reasonable and 
thus not constitutional.170 
Another area of disagreement between the majority and the dissent in 
Mack surrounded the police officers’ subjective good faith.171  The dissent 
again pointed to Edmond, in which the Court found that setting up a trap so as 
to avoid inconvenience was irrelevant and could “play no role in ordinary, 
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”172  Not withstanding the 
previously Court-approved exceptions, a checkpoint must always create the 
requisite amount of individualized suspicion, to be determined by objective 
means, rather than by the police officers’ subjective explanations.173  The 
dissent continued, “our inquiry is not whether the police subjectively tried to 
create a basis for individualized suspicion . . . [r]ather, the inquiry is whether 
the way the drug checkpoint was in fact set up, considered objectively, created 
the kind of individualized suspicion required by Edmond.”174  The dissent 
found it paradoxical that a checkpoint scheme such as the one in Mack could 
create individualized suspicion when every vehicle that took the Old Cap Au 
Gris exit was stopped.175  The record revealed that between sixty and one 
hundred and fifty vehicles exited during the life span of this checkpoint.176  
According to the majority’s reasoning, every one of these vehicles met the 
required “individualized suspicion” standard simply because they exited the 
highway.177  The dissent suggested that this was “group suspicion” disguised 
as individualized suspicion, and was unconstitutional.178 
The dissent also refuted the majority’s conclusion that the effectiveness of 
the ruse checkpoint somehow led to its “propriety.”179  The dissent cited Sitz, 
where that Court held that the effectiveness of a certain law enforcement tactic 
was not entirely determinative of a checkpoint’s constitutionality.180  The Sitz 
 
 170. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 563. 
 171. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 714 (Stith, J., dissenting).  The majority adopted the idea that the 
police tried to set up the checkpoint in a manner that would cause the least amount of 
inconvenience for local residents and those who might have had a non-criminal reason for exiting 
the highway.  Id. 
 172. Id. (citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000)). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 714 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 177. Id.  The dissent further noted, “[t]his type of suspicion is hardly ‘individualized.’  If the 
Court approves this procedure today, it, in effect, will have approved ‘group suspicion’ as a basis 
for stopping each individual in the group.” Id. 
 178. Id. at 714-15. 
 179. Id. at 715. 
 180. Id. (citing Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1990)).  In Mack, 
the dissent stated “that courts must not consider the relative effectiveness of a chosen path of law 
enforcement activity in determining its constitutional propriety.  So long as the technique 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] “GOTCHA!” A CASE NOTE ON STATE v. MACK 693 
Court did analyze the statistics of the Michigan checkpoint program as part of 
the “Brown Balancing Test,” but it did not conclude that the statistics were so 
overwhelming so as to elevate the checkpoint into a higher level of police 
enforcement tactic that the Mack majority suggested.181  The Mack majority 
suggested that ruse checkpoints are so effective that they belong to a 
heightened category of police tactic because the checkpoints themselves 
created the required individualized suspicion.182  The dissent looked to the 
record in Mack to show that this proposition was not true.183  Although the 
record was inconclusive regarding the exact numbers (the dissent found that 
the inexactness of the record-keeping was yet another problem with these 
checkpoints), the police testified that approximately five of the sixty to one 
hundred and fifty cars that took the Old Cap Au Gris exit lead to a drug-related 
arrest.184  In the cases of Edmond and Damask, which used similar types of 
checkpoints,185 the “hit rate” was approximately nine percent and 1.5% 
respectively.186  These relatively low percentages discredit the State’s 
contention that these checkpoints, especially ruse checkpoints, are so much 
more effective than regular, everyday police techniques.187 
Perhaps the most practical and common sense-based arguments the dissent 
presented were the various, non-criminal reasons why motorists might have 
taken the “rigged” exit.  Contrary to what the majority accepted, the dissent 
found legitimate reasons why motorists might have taken the Old Cap Au Gris 
exit.  The dissent suggested reasons such as the following: a law-abiding 
motorist could have wanted to get home or to another place of destination 
without the hassle of a drug check, motorists might not have wanted to change 
travel plans, or motorists might have had a general fear of the police.188  A 
motorist not from the area, which was a small community, or a motorist of a 
 
employed is reasonable, the decision whether to use it or some other approach, whether more or 
less effective, is left in the hands of law enforcement officials.”  Id. 
 181. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. 
 182. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 715 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 183. Id.  The dissent refuted this notion when it found, “[n]either the record, nor common 
human experience . . . supports the principal opinion’s assumption that only those engaged in 
criminal activity would ‘take the bait’ and exit the highway at Old Cap Au Gris in response to the 
subterfuge the police employed here.”  Id. at 715. 
 184. Id. at 715 n.3. 
 185. The Edmond checkpoint, however, was not a ruse. 
 186. In Edmond, 1,161 vehicles were stopped and one hundred and four arrests were made, 
fifty-five of which were drug-related.  In Damask, approximately sixty-six cars drove into the 
checkpoint, ten of which were searched.  Only one arrest was made in that case, and that was of 
the defendant.  Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 716 (Stith, J., dissenting) (citing City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000)); State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1996). 
 187. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 716.  The dissent noted that the Supreme Court held in Edmond that 
a nine percent overall success rate was not enough to create individualized suspicion.  Id. 
 188. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
694 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:669 
minority ethnic background might have been afraid of becoming a target of 
harassment in such a system.189  The record went on to show that there were 
numerous residences near the exit, and that the road to which the exit led could 
have been used to get to downtown Troy.190  The dissent determined that the 
road near the exit might not have been the most direct route to Troy, but 
depending on traffic, it might have been just as timely as the other routes.191 
Defendant Mack was not the only individual who might have had non-
criminal reasons for taking this exit.192  On a few past occasions, the Old Cap 
Au Gris exit became so backlogged because of the checkpoint program that 
cars began to back up into the travel lanes of the highway.193  To remedy the 
jam, police would waive many vehicles through without even so much as 
taking “a glance” at them.194  The officer in charge provided only an estimate, 
but he guessed that about forty-six of approximately eighty total vehicles were 
approached by a police officer.195  After examining the inexactness of the 
Mack system, it tends to look more like the random scheme that was 
disfavored in Edmond rather than a system that adhered to strict, objective, 
state-mandated guidelines.196  The dissent contended that because the Court 
ruled group searches unconstitutional in Edmond, the Missouri Supreme Court 
was obliged to do the same.  The dissent also pointed out that if the police 
really believed that every vehicle that took the exit had drugs within it, they 
would not have waived all those cars through without even giving them a 
preliminary glance.197 
One final and key argument made by the dissent was that defendant 
Mack’s swerving conduct in his car did not lead to his stop as the majority 
contended.  The record was clear that his car was stopped because he exited, 
not because he swerved.198  Nowhere did the police state that they stopped him 
 
 189. Id. at 716-17. 
 190. Id. at 718. 
 191. Id.  The defendant Mack testified that he was on his way to a bar located in Troy and that 
is why he exited.  The police officer confirmed that this would have been an acceptable route to 
get from Mack’s house to the bar.  Id. 
 192. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 719 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 719 n.7. 
 196. Id.  In Edmond, the police stopped and talked with drivers of a group of cars on the 
highway, while letting others go by with no detention.  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 
U.S. 32, 35-36 (2000). 
 197. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 719 (Stith, J., dissenting).  The dissent found, “the fact that police 
were willing to send those cars on their way is a strong indicator that the police did not really 
form an individualized suspicion of criminal activity from the mere fact that the cars exited at Old 
Cap Au Gris.”  Id. 
 198. Id. at 720. 
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because of his conduct.199  Accordingly, this was an “after-the fact” argument 
put forward to justify the stop.200  The dissent did acknowledge that according 
to Brugal, the police are entitled to consider the “totality of the 
circumstances.”201  Factors such as the vehicle’s swerving and the open 
container of alcohol in the vehicle, when considered with the circumstances 
surrounding the checkpoint, can be used in deciding whether there was enough 
of the required suspicion to detain the defendant further.202  The dissent 
emphasized however, that the issue to be decided was the constitutionality of 
the initial stop.203 
IV.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS: USING EDMOND-PRECEDENT, RUSE CHECKPOINTS 
SHOULD BE ABOLISHED 
As evidenced by the lengthy and somewhat inconsistent chain of court 
decisions on the issue of police use of vehicle checkpoints, there does not seem 
to be a definitive, ready-made answer to the question of the constitutionality of 
these checkpoints.  Even the Edmond decision, which was intended to provide 
that so-called easy answer, was marked with a sharp disagreement between the 
majority and dissenting opinions.204  After analyzing both opinions in Edmond, 
it is still unclear which test should be applied in determining the 
constitutionality of certain vehicle checkpoint cases.205  Both the “primary 
purpose test” and the “Brown Balancing Test” have been approved by the 
Court in the past, and yet, as seen in Edmond, both tests can yield differing 
results.  The fine line between those cases in which vehicle checkpoints are a 
legitimate means of remedying a social ill and do not infringe upon the 
constitutional rights of the motorist and those cases that do infringe on a 
motorist’s Fourth Amendment rights is often difficult to locate.  However, 
considering the ambiguity that courts now have to deal with in deciding 
 
 199. Id.  “[T]he state did introduce evidence of this swerving at trial, but the issue is not 
whether the state recognized at trial that it needed an alternative ground for the stop to support the 
stop but whether the police actually had an alternative ground at the time Mr. Mack was seized by 
them . . . .  They did not.”  Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 720 n.8. (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 202. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 720 n.8. 
 203. Id. 
 204. This note will analyze the Mack decision as if it had been decided using either the 
primary purpose test that the Edmond majority used, or the “Brown Balancing Test” that the 
Edmond dissent used.  Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Edmond Court and was 
joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Chief Justice Rehnquist filed 
the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia.  Justice Thomas also 
filed a separate dissenting opinion.  City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 33 (2000). 
 205. The majority opinion analyzed the Indianapolis vehicle checkpoint according to its 
primary purpose.  Id. at 41-42.  The dissenting opinion applied the “Brown Balancing Test” to the 
checkpoints in order to determine their constitutionality.  Id. at 49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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vehicle checkpoint cases, especially those of the ruse variation, the Missouri 
Supreme Court should have made a different finding than it did in Mack.  The 
majority opinion does not do justice to the long-established history of 
roadblock jurisprudence that was developed to aid future court decisions such 
as the one in Mack.  The discussion of the Edmond principles is rather cursory, 
and the long-approved “Brown Balancing Test” is ignored altogether. 
This note does not suggest that the vehicle checkpoints in Mack were 
identical to those in Edmond.  It would be unfair to maintain that the Missouri 
Supreme Court had no choice but to follow Edmond.  A case could be made, 
and in fact was made by the majority, that the two cases were distinguishable.  
However, the Missouri Supreme Court certainly could have applied the dual 
Edmond tests to this “distinguishable” ruse checkpoint case.  If it had done so, 
the outcome in Mack would have been the same as that in Edmond.  Starting 
with the rationale that the United States Supreme Court used in the Edmond 
majority opinion, it should have been evident that the Mack checkpoint was 
established to help eradicate the same societal problem for which the Edmond 
checkpoint was established.  The checkpoint in Mack was not developed to 
serve any of the previously Court-approved purposes where the general rule of 
individualized suspicion is suspended, such as retarding the influx of illegal 
immigration,206 reducing the number of drunk drivers,207 serving 
administrative purposes,208 or even the potentially appropriate purpose of 
examining driver’s licenses and vehicle registrations.209  The Mack checkpoint, 
like the Edmond checkpoint, was established with the aim of preventing 
general criminal wrongdoings.  The State in Mack does not even attempt to use 
the “secondary purpose” argument that the State did in Edmond.  The 
petitioners in Edmond tried to convince the Court that the checkpoint was 
justified because it had a legitimate, dual purpose of checking licenses and 
registrations.210  The Court in Edmond immediately recognized the problems 
that would come with approval of “secondary purposes” for legitimizing a 
checkpoint.  If the Court had accepted the petitioner’s argument, any 
imaginable type of checkpoint would be allowed if it had a legitimate purpose 
attached.211  The State in Mack did not even attempt to mask the primary 
purpose of its checkpoint, which was to reduce the amount of drug trafficking 
on Missouri highways.212 
 
 206. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
 207. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 208. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). 
 209. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 
357 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 210. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 53 U.S. 32, 40-41 (2000). 
 211. Id. at 42. 
 212. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. 2002). 
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The State of Missouri argued that its checkpoints were fundamentally 
different than those in Edmond because the required level of individualized 
suspicion was present, whereas in Edmond it was not.213  The State elaborated 
that the purpose of the Missouri checkpoints was to generate suspicion by 
deceiving drivers engaged in criminal activity to exit the highway.214  This ruse 
however, still does not mask the primary purpose of the entire program, which 
was to interdict the transportation of drugs.  Even assuming that the trick did 
generate the appropriate level of individualized suspicion, this Missouri 
checkpoint system still serves unconstitutional purposes.  The Missouri 
Supreme Court should have decided, as did the majority in Edmond, that 
“because the primary purpose . . . is ultimately indistinguishable from the 
general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violate[d] the Fourth 
Amendment.”215 
Not only is the primary purpose test easily deciphered in Mack, the State’s 
premise that the checkpoint’s entire reason for being was to generate suspicion 
is also flawed.  Judge Stith’s dissent highlighted an abundance of non-criminal 
reasons for avoiding the checkpoint.  In examining the results of a similar 
South Carolina variation216 of the Missouri ruse checkpoint, designed to check 
driver’s licenses and registrations, the Brugal court found that one driver 
exited because he “was nervous about not having a driver’s license.”217  Two 
other drivers exited simply because they were lost.218  There are a number of 
ways for an unsuspecting motorist to inadvertently find himself in the teeth of 
one of these ruse checkpoints.  Courts have almost always discovered that no 
matter how remote the selected location for the ruse checkpoint is, an innocent 
motorist can somehow end up in it.219  The dissent in Mack acknowledged that 
it was feasible for Mack to get to his Troy bar destination by taking the Old 
Cap Au Gris exit.220  Using the Edmond decision as a guide, the Missouri 
 
 213. Id. at 709. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48. 
 216. The South Carolina checkpoint was a different kind of ruse.  As motorists approached 
Exit 22, they passed two large signs on the interstate reading “DRUG CHECKPOINT AHEAD.”  
The first sign was posted 1000 feet before Exit 22, and the second was posted five hundred feet 
before the exit.  However, there was no drug checkpoint on Interstate 95.  Instead, a checkpoint 
was established at Exit 22’s exit ramp to verify the driver’s license and vehicle registration of 
every motorist that exited.  The decoy drug checkpoint signs were placed on the interstate 
intending “that people carrying narcotics will become erratic, exit off the interstate, throw the 
narcotics out or . . . cross the median and go back in the opposite direction.”  United States v. 
Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 354-55 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 217. Id. at 355 n.1. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id.  See also State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 717 (Mo. 2002) (Stith, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 827-28 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 220. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 718 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
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Supreme Court should have found that the sole fact that a motorist exited a 
highway cannot be enough to justify this type of drug enforcement tactic. 
Certain individuals in the legal community with a heightened interest or 
special knowledge in roadblock jurisprudence might contend that the 
dissenting opinion in Edmond was as insightful, if not more so, than the 
majority opinion.  The dissent’s principal arguments were that the majority 
completely ignored the established “Brown Balancing Test” in determining a 
checkpoint’s constitutionality, and that the majority essentially invented this 
“primary purpose” element not found anywhere in the language of the Fourth 
Amendment.  If the Missouri Supreme Court had applied the “Brown 
Balancing Test,” the answer should have been just as clear as was the original 
“primary purpose” test.  If the United States Supreme Court found it necessary 
to use the “Brown Balancing Test” in deciding Sitz, the Missouri Supreme 
Court should have felt compelled to do so with Mack. 
The Mack court could have applied the three-pronged “Brown Balancing 
Test” in an easy, straightforward manner.  The logic in applying the first prong 
is the same as it was in Sitz.221  Much like the drinking and driving problem in 
Sitz, few could deny the severity of the drug problem in the United States today 
or the government’s interest in eliminating it.  The War on Drugs is a constant 
battle for government officials that many citizens would contend America is 
losing.222 
The second prong of the “Brown Balancing Test” is slightly more difficult 
to understand and apply.  The second prong weighs “the degree to which the 
seizure advances the public interest” and has evolved to the point that 
empirical data factors into the decision.  This is the area where the overall “hit 
rate”223 becomes part of the equation.  One of the principal reasons why the 
Court in Prouse did not offer its acceptance of a strictly license and registration 
checkpoint was because of the absence of any empirical data of the success of 
such a checkpoint.224  In the Court-approved programs found in Sitz and 
Martinez-Fuerte, the hit rates were 1.6%225 and 0.5%226 respectively.  In both 
of those instances, the Court found the success rates sufficient to pass 
constitutional muster.  The Supreme Court reversed its course when it found 
that the nine percent hit rate in Edmond was insufficient to create the requisite 
 
 221. The Sitz Court stated, “No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken 
driving problem or the States’ interests in eradicating it.”  Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 
U.S. 444, 451 (1990). 
 222. See id. 
 223. The overall hit rate refers to the ratio of the total number of arrests made at a certain 
checkpoint compared to the total number of cars stopped at that checkpoint. 
 224. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979). 
 225. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.  Out of one hundred and twenty six drivers detained at the 
checkpoint, two motorists were arrested for drunken driving.  Id. at 454. 
 226. Id. at 455 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)). 
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amount of individualized suspicion to be considered constitutionally valid.227  
The record-keeping procedures in Mack were so inconsistent that no accurate 
percentages were provided, but from the raw data estimates, it seemed that the 
“hit rate” was comparable to the percentages computed in Edmond.  Courts 
have concluded that to satisfy the second prong of the “Brown Balancing 
Test,” the checkpoints do not have to be the most effective means of achieving 
the State’s interests.  The courts “need only decide whether, balanced with the 
importance of the governmental interest and degree of intrusion, checkpoints 
are at least reasonably effective as a tool in advancing the government’s 
interest.”228  The Missouri Supreme Court could have determined that these 
types of ruse checkpoints were “reasonably effective” in advancing the 
government’s interest in removing drugs from Missouri roadways.  However, 
the small amount of empirical data revealing inconclusive hit rates found in 
Mack refutes the argument provided by the State that the use of these ruse 
checkpoints is so effective that this police technique should be elevated to level 
all its own.  This technique seems to be no more successful than any other 
police technique for combating drugs. 
The third prong of the “Brown Balancing Test” should have and would 
have been the crux of the case had the Missouri Supreme Court used it to 
arrive at its decision.  Although the objective intrusion on the individual 
motorist might have been as minimal as it was in Edmond or Damask,229 the 
subjective intrusion in Mack certainly was not.  In determining the level of 
subjective intrusion, the critical factor is as follows: 
[W]hether the checkpoint is planned and operated in such a manner as to 
minimize the amount of discretion that officers at the scene may use in running 
the checkpoint.  Was the checkpoint conducted according to a plan prepared in 
advance . . . were all vehicles stopped or, if not, were there specific, non-
discretionary criteria used to generate a random determination as to which 
vehicles would be stopped, as opposed to some sort of discretionary selection 
method?230 
he Damask court continued, “[a] second element is also important to the 
subjective intrusion analysis: the extent to which the stop might generate 
concern or fright on the part of lawful travelers.”231  This comment is ironic 
because the court in Damask did not find a substantial subjective intrusion on 
motorists’ rights, even though the entire checkpoint operation in that case was 
 
 227. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35, 44 (2000).  See also State v. Mack, 66 
S.W.3d 706, 716 (Mo. 2002) (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 228. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 572 (Mo. 1996). 
 229. The stops in Edmond and Damask lasted for a couple minutes.  See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 
36; Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574. 
 230. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574. 
 231. Id.  “The nature of the checkpoint and the presence of law enforcement personnel should 
be readily ascertainable to motorists stopped at the checkpoint.”  Id. 
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designed to deceive unsuspecting motorists.  The Mack checkpoint was 
deceptive, patterned after the one in Damask, and unlike the regular, 
permanent checkpoints in Edmond, Sitz, and the other previously-approved 
checkpoint cases.  The operator of the vehicle was not aware of the checkpoint 
and was tricked into it.  This element of unwanted surprise is relevant because 
the average motorist is afraid of the police.  The dissent in Sitz noted that, 
“[t]hose who have found—by reason of prejudice or misfortune—that 
encounters with the police may become adversarial or unpleasant without good 
cause will have grounds for worrying at any stop designed to elicit signs of 
suspicious behavior.”232 
Anyone who has been driving in their car and has seen the flashing red and 
blue lights in the rear-view mirror knows that police encounters are normally 
unpleasant.  People are instinctively apprehensive, even if they have not 
broken any laws, when encountering police on the roadways.  In addition to the 
general fear of police, most ordinary motorists want to avoid delays on the 
road whenever possible.  Desiring to avoid delays and to avoid police officers 
should not criminalize an individual, but according to the State of Missouri, 
that is what these ruse checkpoints do.  By prolonging the vitality of these 
checkpoints in Missouri, the court promotes feelings of distrust and dislike 
toward local police departments.  If the Missouri Supreme Court had applied 
the final prong of the “Brown Balancing Test” to the facts of Mack, it would 
have seen that the subjective intrusion into the lives of individual motorists 
was certainly not minimal.  The level of surprise and fear that these ruse 
checkpoints could generate are surely substantial enough to fail the final prong 
of the Brown constitutionality test. 
One important point of emphasis found in the Mack majority opinion, 
which does not fit into the “Brown Balancing Test” package, is the fact that 
Mack’s individual conduct might or might not have been part of the puzzle.  
The majority sought to justify its decision by the fact that Mack drove his car 
suspiciously while exiting the highway.  The majority determined that 
evidence of his sudden veering and almost missing his turn, “when coupled 
with the deceptive checkpoint scheme, certainly compels a finding of 
‘individualized’ suspicion.”233  The inherent flaw in this logic seems to be that 
Mack’s particular conduct should not, and in fact did not, make any difference 
under this particular checkpoint scheme.  The checkpoint scheme itself was 
unconstitutional.  The dissent classified the majority’s reasoning with respect 
to Mack’s driving conduct as “an after-the-fact rationalization made to justify a 
stop that was clearly based on the fact that Mr. Mack exited the highway at the 
 
 232. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 465 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 233. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709-10 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).  The court also noted “the 
only reason [for introducing the evidence] was to show that the officers were even more 
suspicious of this particular driver’s conduct.”  Id. at 710 (emphasis in original). 
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Old Cap Au Gris exit.”234  In Yousif, the Court of Appeals dismissed the 
officer’s arguments that they possessed the required amount of individualized 
suspicion because of the defendant’s conduct in exiting the highway.  The 
court there found, “All of these indicators, [i.e.] Defendant’s initial 
hesitation . . . nervousness and shaking . . . and the overwhelming berry-
scented air freshener, would not exist but for the illegal checkpoint.”235  In 
much the same manner, Mack could have been driving flawlessly, he could 
have been driving backwards, or he could have been driving a tank, and the 
situation in which he found himself would have remained the same.  He was 
stopped at the checkpoint not because he almost missed his turn, but simply 
because he got off at the exit.  That is exactly the type of checkpoint scheme 
that is unreasonably intrusive on an individual motorist and should be 
immediately ended. 
The Mack dissent phrased the situation succinctly: “The driver would be 
put in a ‘Catch-22’ of either proceeding down the highway and being stopped 
at an unconstitutional checkpoint, or exiting to avoid it and risk being stopped 
at a ruse checkpoint set up to catch those who had exited.”236  The dissent 
realized that Edmond had already ruled any checkpoint designed for general 
crime prevention purposes unconstitutional, even ones not set up as a ruse.  
The fact that it was a surprise to the driver made the entire decision all the 
more unpalatable.  The dissent continued: “There is something fundamentally 
unsettling and counter-intuitive about labeling as suspicious a person’s conduct 
in avoiding the state’s own unconstitutional conduct.”237  The dissent wrote 
convincingly and presented non-criminal reason upon reason that individuals 
might have for avoiding a police-run drug checkpoint.238  The entire premise 
that the ruse checkpoints created the requisite amount of individualized 
suspicion was adequately refuted by the dissent and should have been afforded 
more weight by the Mack majority. 
The solution to this problem is not earth-shattering.  The United States 
Supreme Court revealed its true intentions on the subject of vehicle 
checkpoints when it handed down the Edmond decision, and the Eighth Circuit 
recognized that revelation in Yousif.  The Missouri Supreme Court’s decision 
in Mack is analogous to a fish out of water.  The underlying tenet of the Fourth 
Amendment is that an individual has a right to be free from “suspicionless 
searches” unless certain, court-established special circumstances are present.  
Therefore, a blanket rule prohibiting police departments across the country 
from using ruse checkpoints as a method of combating the War on Drugs 
 
 234. Id. at 720 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 235. United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 826 (8th Cir. 2002) (alteration in original). 
 236. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 717 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 716-17. 
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seems to be the most simplistic and effective means of preventing further cases 
like Mack from arising.  America’s fight against drugs cannot come at the 
expense of the total elimination of an individual’s constitutional rights.  The 
Edmond Court went to great lengths to stress the fact that its decision did not 
alter the constitutionality of the border checkpoint cases, the sobriety 
checkpoint cases, and even the driver’s license checkpoint cases.239  The Court 
also noted, “[o]ur holding does not affect the validity of border searches or 
searches at places like airports and government buildings, where the need for 
such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute.”240  However, 
the Edmond Court was equally as adamant about expressing its disapproval of 
checkpoints with the primary purpose of general crime control.  Individual 
motorists must still be afforded some degree of security in an automobile. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Obviously, many in the legal community have differing views on the 
subject of ruse checkpoints as evidenced by the numerous inconsistent 
outcomes of checkpoint cases.  The problem with the unpredictable results is 
that the ruse checkpoint cases are capable of hitting close to home.  The 
scenario in this note is not a made-up, purely hypothetical, academic study.  
There is a common, practical bond that these cases share.  Any motorist, 
especially any Missouri motorist, could fall victim to one of these traps.  Many 
drivers on the roads today might not have any idea that the police are even 
using ruse checkpoints.  In order for them to be spared from the surprise and 
humiliation that Mack was faced with, the courts must not allow ruse 
checkpoints to continue.  Not only do these checkpoints fail to serve a 
constitutional primary purpose, they are not extraordinarily effective, and they 
are subjectively intrusive on the liberty rights of a motorist.  Ruse checkpoints 
will apparently continue for as long as the Missouri Supreme Court is allowed 
to reach decisions like it did in Mack.  To put an end to this, either a blanket 
rule ending ruse checkpoints must become law in Missouri or the court must 
change its thinking.  Until this happens, Missouri motorists everywhere must 
be on the lookout. 
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